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S7.-. 

/4'0

SiMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

MIMORANDUM

SENATE 

?

From

SENATE COMMITTEE ON UNDERGRADUATE 

STUDIES 

Subject

FACULTY OF ARTS - NEW COURSE 

?

Date ?

November 12, 1974? 

PROPOSAL ECON 490-5. 

THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE 

MOTION: ? 

"That Senate approve - and recommend approval 

to the Board - the new course proposal as set 

forth in S.74- 

l4O

for

ECQN 

490-5 

The Economics 

of Collective Choice." 

SiMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

MEMORANDUM

SENATE ? 

IFrom

SENATE vTrr 

?

UNDEIDUATE &JDIES 

Subject

..............................................................................................................

Date.

November ? 

12,

?

1974

At its meeting of 5th November, the Senate Committee on 

Undergraduate Studies discussed a new course proposal from the 

Department of Economics and Commerce for offering Econ.-490-5: 

The Economics of Collective Choice. ? 

It was noted that this 

course had been offered previously under Econ.483-3: Selected 

Topics in Economics and that the Department had regarded the 

course as of sufficient worth to offer it on a regular basis. 

In this context, concern was expressed by some members of the 

Committee that students who had already taken Econ.483 with 

this topic may also be able to take the new course for credit; 

but the Committee was assured that the Department would be able 

to take measures to ensure that this was not the case. 

This course is now forwarded to Senate for its 

consideration with the Committee's recommendation that it be 

approved. 

I. Mugridge 

ams

att. 

'SENATE COMMITTEE ON UNDERGRADUATE STUDIES'1 

NEW COURSE PROPOSAL FORM 

Calendar Information 

?

Department:____ ? 

Economics 

Abbreviation Code:Econ. Course Number: 

+90-5 

?

Credit Hours: 5 Vector: 3-2-0 

Title of Course: The Economics of Collective Choice 

Calendar Description OF Course: 

The application of economic theory to political institutions and other non-market 

social phenomena. Some of the to 

?

covered are the relationship of property rights 

to allocation; the theory of optimal constitutions; Voting behavior and coalition 

formation; the theory of jurisdictions and federalism; the theory of bureaucracy; the 

economics of income redistributions; the economics of crime, violence, anarchy, 

family and marriage, discrimination, and nationalism. 

Nature of Course: 

Lectures and tutorials will be given exploring positive and normative questions of 

collective choice. The undergraduate will become aware of the power of economics to 

analyze a wide variety of political and social problems outside the traditional range 

explored In the thoery of markets. 

Prerequisites (or special instructions): 

Econ 

302-3

What course (courses), if any, is being dropped from the calendar if this course is 

approved: 

None, 

2.

Scheduling 

How frequently will the course be offered? Once a year. 

Semester in which the course will first be offered? Fall of 

1975.

Which of your present faculty would be available to make the proposed offering possible? 

Thomas E. Borcherding 

Zane A. Spindler 

3.

Objectives of the Course 

The course will fill a need not currently being met at the university by any 

of the social science departments. Courses of this variety are currently being given 

at University of Virginia, Carleton University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 

University of Washington (Seattle), Washington University (St. Louis), U.C.L.A. and 

University of Texas to name just a few. The objective is to acquaint the student 

In economics and in other areas of the social sciences with the rich and varied 

applications of rational choice thoery to non-market activities. 

This course was given as Econ. 

83-3, 

Selected Topics in Economics, in Fall 1973. 

It was enthusiastically received according to the course evaluations (attached) and 

several students suggested that this course should be regularly offered. Attached 

is a syllabus of that course. Econ. 

1

+90-5 would follow basically the sameoutline 

with appropriate changes to reflect current areas of non-market concern. 

-2-

4.

Budgetary and Space Requirements (for information only) 

What additional resources will be required in the following areas: 

Faculty 

?

None. 

Staff ? 

None. 

Library 

?

None. 

Audio Visual None. 

Space 

?

None. 

Equipment ? 

None. 

5.

Approval 

Date:_____________________ 

?

OCT 241974

%

,  11) 

LI-7

Departmen Chairman 

?

Chairman, SCUS 

SCUS 73-34b:- (When completing this form, for instructions see Memorandum SCUS 73-34a. 

Attach course outline). 

Oct. '73 

11-0

Economic In

structions !.

Syllabus for Economics --

The Economics of Collective Choice

The double starred readngs are required; the single starred readings ire

interested in the subject and wish guidance in their further pursuance of he

topic. Everyone Is expected to read the two classics, Anthony Downs, An Economic

heor

of Democracy

(1957)

and James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calcu1T

of Consent (196lYin their entirety.

I. Review of Some Basic Concepts.

Your intermediate price theory test may be helpful here. If you

do not own one or have not taken Economics 302, a hard look at one

of the following textswill

clear

up any points that you find

difficult to understand from the lectures.

Charles E. Ferguson, tlicroeconomic Theory, 2nd Edition (1972).

l4icha Gisser, Introductionto Price Theory, 2nd Edition (1969).

Kelvin Lancaster, Introduction to Modern Microeconomics (1969).

e) Richard Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation,

4th Edition, (1970).

Anarchy and the Establishnent of Property Rights.

a) Gordon Tul lock, "Th Edge of the Jungle", in Tuflock

(ed)

Explorations in

the Theory of Anarchy (1973).

* ?

b) Thomas Hogarty, "Cases in Anarchy", in Tul lock,Exploration-,...

c) Winston Bush, "Individual Welfare in Anarchy",

inTullock, 

Explorations.

(A difficult paper, but very thoughtful).

ArmerrAlchian, "Some Economics of Property Rights", II Politico,

30 (Dec.

1965),

816-29.

Competitive Allocations under Costless Enforcements of Private Property Rights.

a) Francis Bator, "The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization," Am. Ecorn.

Rev.,

(Mar.

1957),

22-59. Equivalent chapters are found in almost

every intermediate economic theory text.

Some Forms of Market Failures and Justification of Government under irn7erfectly

Enforceable Property Rights.

4.1

Monopoly

•a) Gisser, Introduction, Ch. 12.

•

b) Harold Demset"Wy Regulate Utilities," J. of Law & Econ.

a) Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," J. of Ln,

Econ.

3 (Oct. 1960), 114.

b) Ralph Turvey, "On Diveiqences

Between Social Cost 

arid 

Private Cost," Economica, 30 (Auq. 1963),

309-13

i a

good summary art i ci e but coiip 1 cinen

Economics 1183 

Page 2. 

?

S

*

?

?

c) James Buchanan and W. Craig Stubbiebine, "External ity" 

• ? 

Economica, 29 (Nov. 

1962), 371-84.

** ? 

d) Gordon Tullock, Private Wants and Public Needs 

(1970),

Cbs. 4 and 

4.3

Public Goods and "Free Riding" 

*1 ?

a) Paul A. Samuelson, "A Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory 

• ? 

of Public Expenditures" Rev, of Econ. and Stat., 37 

(Nov.

1955),

350-560.

b)

Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods. (1963), 

Chs. 2-3.

?

' ?

c) Tullock,

Private Wants, Chs. 

1-3; 8-9.

4.4

Three applications of the E,terna1ity-Public Goods Notion: 

International Fisheries, Highways Congestion and Urban 

Renewal. 

a) Otto Davis and Andrew Whinston, "Economcs of Urban 

Renewal,"

in Edmond S. Phelps, (ed.) Private Wants ' 

and Public Heeds 

(1967).

* ?

b) ScottGordo 

, "The Economic Theory of a Corrrnori-Property 

Resource: The Fishery," J. of Pol. Econ, 62 (Ap.- 1954), 

124-42. 

?

--

c)

Steven U.S. Cheung, "The Structure 

a Contract and 

the

Theory 

of a Non-Exclusive Resource," J. of Law & Econ. 13 (Ap. 1970) 

d)

Downs, "The Law Of Peak-Hour Expressway Congestion," in his 

S

Urban Problem and Prospects (1970). 

e) A.A. Walters, 'The Theory and Measurement of Private and Soc. 

Cost of Highway Congestion" Econometrica, 29 

(Oct. 

1961), 

678-81.

Tullock,

Private Wants, Ch. 10. 

g) Alchian and Wm. R. Allen, Exchange and Production in Use 

(1971),

Chs. 8 and 

12.

Voting as an Alternative Institution for Social Choice. 

5.1

Optimal Constitutions and Efficient Non-Unanimous 

Decisions

** ? 

a) Buchanan and Tul lock, The Calculus of Consent (1962), 

Cbs. 

5-8; 

Cbs. 1-4 and the appendices. 

5.2

Problems of Citizenry Voting 

i

?

?

b) Tul lock, Towards a Mathematics of Politics 

(1957), 

Ch.

c) Duncan Black, Theory of Comm ittecs and Elections (I 95C) 

5.3

Coalition Formation, Parties and Political Entrepreneurs 

a)

Downs, An Economic Theory, Chs. 1-2, 

5-10.

Tullock, Private

Wnts,Ch. 

13;

Towards_aMati.. Cbs. 

3

and 4 

are Interesting but not required. 

c)

William Riker, The Theory of Coalitions, Chs. 1-4. 

d)

t1ncur Olson, The Lonic 

.

jjj

?

\JJJ) (N 

), P-trt 1, bit. 

also see Richard E. Wagner, 'Pressure Groiip and Political 

Entrepreneurs", Public Cho!cc I (1966), 161-70.. 

* ?

e) ? 

Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus, Ch. 9-12; also so 

Part IV. 

S

f) Albert and Raymond Brctoii,'An Economic Theory of Social 

Movements, 

Am.

Econ.

Rev: Supp . , 59 

(Hay

1969) , I 205.

1 1

An Application of this Theory 

a) Thomas E. (3orcherd i ng and Robert T. Deacon, ''Th 

t):nind Ir r

the Serv icns of Iori "Fedra 1 (;ov(•rnmn ts ," A. 

Econ. 

.

62 (Dcc.

1972).

89I901.

Economics 433 

:Pqge 3. 

.6. The Ecoriomi 

6.2

a)

George Stigler, "Director's Law of Public Income Distribution," 

J. of Law and_Econ 

9

l3

(Ap. 1970), 1-10. 

h) Tullock, "The Charity of the Uncharitable," 

West. 

Econ. J. 

9 (Dec. 

1971), 379-92;

Tullock, Private Warts, Ch. 14. 

7. Bureaucracy and Problems from the ion-Competitive Supply of Public Services 

a)

Aichiari and Reuben Kessel, "Competition Monopoly and the 

Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain," in Aspects of 

Labor

Economics 

(1962).

b)

William A. flskanen, Bureaucracy and RpLesentative_Government 

(1971), Chs. 2-5. ?

c)

Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy 

(1965) 

and Oliver A. 

Williamson, "Hierarchial Control and Optimum Firm 

?

ZCI!

J. Pol. Econ. 

(Ap. 

1967) 123-33.

d)

Otto A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky, 'On the 

Process of Budgeting: An Empirical Study of Congressional 

Appropriations," Public_Choice,l 

(1966) 63-132.

But their 

. ?

position is devasted by Olivier E. Williamson, "A Rational 

Theory of the Federal BudgetaryProcess," Public Choice, 2, 

(1967) , 

71-

8

and John E. Jackson. "Politics and tile- 

Budgetary Process," Social Scicnceresearch, 1 CAp. 1j72), 

5-60.

e)

Louis De Alessi, "Implications of Property Rights for 

Government investment Decisions," Am. Econ. 

_Re, 59 

(March 1969), 

13-24.

Reappraisal of the Social Imbalance Hypothesis 

a)

John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Dependence Effect and Social 

Balance," in Phelps, Private Wants. 

b)

Frederick Hayck, "The on-Seguitor of the 'Depe!ence Effect'," 

in Phelps, Private Wants. 

c)

Wm. Craig Stubbiebine, The Social Imbalance Hyootheis, 

unpubl.ishedPh.D. thesis, U. of Virginia 

.

, 190'. 

*1 ?

d) Roland N. Mckein, "The Unseen Hand in Government,' 

?

Am. Econ. Pv. 

(June 

165)

496-505

"Divergences Between individual 

?

/or

Total Costs Within Government," Am. Econ. Rev: Supp. 

I'JtI.

243-49.

c1:

c) Gordon Tul lock, ''The Welfare Costs o Tarriffs, Monopo k., 

and Theft ," West. Econ . J . , 

(June 1967), 224-32 and 

Tul lock P ivate Wmi';s , Chs . 

5-6.

1)

?

Downs, ''Why Lhe Govrnner,t Budget is Too Small in . Dmor:cy ,'' 

in

Phelps, Private Wants. 

W ?

g) Buchanan , ''Why (overnr.:'nt Grows, 

"

in Borcherd I n (d 

and Bureaucrats : The Sources of Government 

?

o.ith

(br uL:a 

;s of income Redistribution 

Justifications 

a)

Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus, Ch. 

13.

b)

James Tobin, "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," 

J. of La'.i & Econ., 

13

(Oct. 

1970), 263-77.

c)

James Meade, Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of 

Property 096). 

Undesirable Political Spi11ovrs 

Economk +83 

Page 

1}

h) C.M. Lindsay and D. Norman, "Reopening the Question of 

Government 

Spending," 

in Borcherding, Budqets. 

I) Milton Friedman, "The Rose of Government in a Free Society," 

in Phelp3, Private Wants. 

j) Richard Bird, The Growth of Government Spending in Canada (197: 

Q Borcherding, "One Tfundred Years of Public 

SpnfJin,

i70-1970" 

and "The Sources of Growth of Public Spendirg in the UnHed 

States, 

1

2

1

970,"

In Borcherding,Budqets. 

Seven Applications of Collective Choice Analysis 

9.1 Federalism and Optimal Fiscal Jurisdictions 

a)

Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," 

J. of Pol. Econ.,61+ (Oct. 1956), 

1+16-2 

1

or Stigler, 

Richard 

- "The Tenable Range of Local Government,"in Phelps, Private 

b)

Richard Wagner, The Fiscal Organization of American 

Federalism 

(1971).

c)

J.C. Weldon, "Public Goods and Federalism, Can. J. of Econ., 

32 (May 1962), 230-38.

d)

Buchanan and Charles J. Goetz, "Efficiency Limits of Fiscal 

Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model," Public 

Economics, 1 (Spring 

1972), 25-43.

Politics of Persuasion and Lying 

a) Tul lock, Towards a Math., Chs. 

8-9.

The Economics of the University 

"The Economics of Stilde.nt 1!nr'st," forth-oming. 

a)b) 

A.

Phi llTp Cartwr 

Breton, 

ight, 

"The

Economics of Dean i ncj: 

1

1h

Care 

and

Feeding of Homo Academicus," West. ET.J, 

3 (no. 2 196),

152-61+. 

c)

Borcherding and Alan N. Freiden, "Reflections on Grade 

Inflation, Educational Devaluation and Teachcr Evaluations," 

New Guard (Oct. 

1973).

d)

Aichian, "Private Property and the Relative Cost of Tenure," 

in Phillip Bradley (ed.), The Public 

Stake

in Union 

_Power. 

(1958).

Nationalism as an Economic Phenomenon 

a)

A. Breton, "The Economics of Nationalism," J. of Pol. Econ., 

72 (Aug. 61+), 376-86.

Harry Johnson, paper on nationalism. 

Integration and Discrimination 

a)

Borcherding, "Some Economics of Forced Integration," forthcomin. 

b)

Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (2nd Ed., 1971). 

Nationalized Health Care 

a) Buchanan, 

?

Inconsistancies in the National Health Service (l)) 

b) C. M.Lincisay, "Medical Care and the Economics o(Thring" 

Economica, 36 (Nov. 1969), 351-62. 

Other Social Phenomenon 

a)

Roland McKeon, "The Economics of Courtesy" in R. Sciden (ed.). 

Essays in Honor 

Nil ton Fricdn (iorthcórr I 

b)

Thomas Ireland, The Economics of 

Sex

(fort hcoiinci). 

c)

Alan N. Freiden, "The Economics of Fad Fashion and 

Eccentric 

forthcoming. 

d) Becker, "A Theory of Marriage," forthcoming. 

c) Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," 

J. of Pol. Econ., 76 (Mar. 

1963), 169-217.

9.2

9,3

9.4

9.5

9.6

9.7